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Using Election Forecasts to Understand
the Potential Influence of Campaigns,
Media, and the Law in U.S. Presidential
Elections
PETER K. ENNS* & JULIUS LAGODNY**
How do campaigns, media, and voting laws influence the
outcome of U.S. Presidential elections? Political scientists
often argue that these factors influence outcomes much less
than commonly thought. To illustrate this argument, we
show that we can predict the presidential vote in each state
with a high degree of accuracy. Specifically, between 2004
and 2016, we correctly predict 94% of all state presidential
vote outcomes. Our predictions are based on a forecasting
model of the Electoral College, based primarily on each
state’s approval rating of the incumbent president (using almost 90,000 survey responses from June and July of election
years), current economic conditions in each state, and state
votes in the previous election. We use these forecasts to help
establish the upper bounds of campaign and media effects.
We argue that identifying the limits of these effects is a critical step when trying to estimate their impact. We also show
how our forecasts can be used to test the aggregate effects
of election-related laws, such as Florida’s Amendment 4—
which enfranchised hundreds of thousands of Floridians
who previously could not vote due to felony convictions—
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and voter ID laws, whose effects are notoriously difficult to
study. We have made our data publicly available to facilitate
further research on these topics.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. presidential campaigns spend billions of dollars, run thousands of television advertisements, and develop highly sophisticated
social media and micro-targeting campaigns.1 Seeking any possible
1

See Christopher Ingraham, Somebody Just Put a Price Tag on the 2016
Election. It’s a Doozy., WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2017, 12:19 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/04/14/somebody-just-put
-a-price-tag-on-the-2016-election-its-a-doozy/ (discussing “staggering” election
costs); Aaron Bycoffe, Tracking Every Presidential Candidate’s TV Ad Buys,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 8, 2020, 10:39 AM), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/
2020-campaign-ads/ (discussing TV advertisements); Dawn C. Nunziato, The
Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1521-22 (2019) (discussing social media in elections); DIANA OWEN, New Media and Political Campaigns, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 823, 823-26
(Kate Kenski & Kathleen Hall Jamieson eds., 2017) (discussing social media and
micro-targeting in elections); Michael Beckel, Team Clinton Sponsored 75 Percent of TV Ads in 2016 Presidential Race, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Nov. 16,
2016, 5:35 pm ET), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/team-clinton-sponsored75-percent-of-tv-ads-in-2016-presidential-race/ (highlighting that, of 500,000 TV
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competitive edge, these campaigns carefully navigate and respond
to shifting campaign finance and election laws and to the rapidly
changing media and information environment.2 As Holly Ann Garnett and Toby S. James conclude, “Elections are entering a new digital era in which there are new opportunities and threats for the conduct and contestation of elections.”3 With good reason, “What
Swings the Vote: The Influence of the U.S. Legal System and the
Media on Presidential Elections” was the focus of the University of
Miami Law Review’s 2020 Symposium.4
To better understand the potential influence of campaigns, media, and the legal system, we focus on understanding the limits of
these effects. Although pundits and media often portray each aspect
of the campaign—the conventions, debates, speeches, and even
speaking gaffes—as having massive potential influence on voters
and the election outcome, we build on political science research that
shows presidential campaigns typically produce limited effects on
election outcomes.5 The influence of the media and political campaigns is smaller than one would expect despite the vast amounts of
time, money, and strategy involved.6

advertisements that aired in the 2016 presidential election, “Team Hilary Clinton
accounted for 75 percent of them”).
2
See Janna Anderson & Lee Raine, Theme 4: The Information Environment
Will Improve, Because People Will Adjust and Make Things Better, PEW RSCH.
CTR. (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/10/19/theme-4the-information-environment-will-improve-because-people-will-adjust-andmake-things-better/; see, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S.
185, 191–93 (2014); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 534–36, 556–57
(2013); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 317–22, 371–72
(2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6–9 (1976); N.C State Conf. of the NAACP
v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214–15 (4th Cir. 2016).
3
Holly Ann Garnett & Toby S. James, Cyber Elections in the Digital Age:
Threats and Opportunities of Technology for Electoral Integrity, 19 ELECTION L.
J. 111, 123 (2020).
4
2020 Symposium, UNIV. MIA. L. REV., https://lawreview.law.miami.edu/
2020-symposium/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
5
See JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT 94 (2004); Andrew Gelman &
Gary King, Why Are American Presidential Election Campaign Polls So Variable
When Votes Are So Predictable?, 23 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 409, 409 (1993); ROBERT
S. ERIKSON & CHRISTOPHER WLEZIEN, THE TIMELINE OF PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGNS 5 (2012).
6
See STIMSON, supra note 5, at 93–94.
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This analysis proceeds in three steps. Part I offers an overview
of the political science literature on presidential campaign effects.
This literature, which shows that campaign effects are often much
more muted than typically thought,7 offers an important foundation
for understanding the potential influence, or lack thereof, of presidential campaigns. With this background, Part II presents a model
we developed to forecast how each state votes in U.S. presidential
elections.8 This model, which is based primarily on economic conditions and presidential approval ratings in each state in June and
July of election years, consistently predicts the national popular
vote—and Electoral College outcomes—with a high degree of accuracy.9 The ability to predict state level outcomes sheds important
light on the potential influence of campaigns. After all, if we can
predict the outcome with a high degree of accuracy, the opportunity
to influence votes must be limited. Part III discusses the implications
of these findings for studying campaign effects and opportunities for
future research. In particular, we show how the data we use in our
analysis, which we have made publicly available, can be extended
to evaluate the effects of various legal constraints on elections, such
as felon disenfranchisement and voter registration laws.10
I.

EXISTING EVIDENCE OF LIMITED PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
EFFECTS
Political scientists have long noted that a few fundamental variables, such as economic conditions and presidential approval ratings, predict the final vote share of U.S. presidential elections with

7

See id. at 94.
See Peter K. Enns & Julius Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner: The State Presidential Approval/State Economy Model, 54 PS: POL.
SCI. & POL. 81, 81–85 (2021) [hereinafter Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020
Electoral College Winner].
9
Id.
10
Peter Enns & Julius Lagodny, Replication Data for: Forecasting the 2020
Electoral College Winner: The State Presidential Approval/State Economy
Model, HARV. DATAVERSE (Aug. 27, 2020) [hereinafter Enns & Lagodny, Replication Data], https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ADMBN9.
8
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a high degree of accuracy well in advance of the election.11 If the
final vote is predictable months in advance,12 it seems unlikely that
the campaign has substantial influence. To see why, consider someone who takes a practice test months before the actual exam. Then,
following the practice test, this person studies every day until the
actual exam. If we wanted to understand the effect of studying, we
would look at the difference in scores between the practice test and
the actual test. If the person did much better on the actual test than
the practice test, we would have evidence consistent with the hypothesis that studying had a large positive impact on the exam. By
contrast, if the scores were identical, we would have evidence that
studying was not effective; it did not change the outcome. If the
practice exam perfectly predicts the actual exam score (because they
are the same), by definition, what came between the practice exam
and actual exam did not change the result.13 The same intuition applies to election forecasts.14 It is hard to imagine that a campaign
influenced many voters if knowing the fundamental variables
months in advance can predict what percentage of the vote the Democratic and Republican candidates will receive on Election Day.
Theoretically, it is possible that the campaign gets an equal number of Democratic voters and Republican voters to switch their positions, implying large but completely offsetting effects of campaigning. In such a situation, we would still correctly predict the
outcome, but we would not grasp the underlying vote switching.
However, we know from panel data where the same respondents are
interviewed in different elections that this type of vote switching

11

See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1; STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, FORECASTING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
54–55 (1983); Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Election Forecasts in 1984: How Accurate
Were They?, 18 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 53, 56–57 (1985).
12
Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 409.
13
Of course, someone could argue that the person might have forgotten information and, therefore, would have performed worse had they not studied every
day between the practice and actual exam. But we are comfortable asserting that
the exertion of extreme effort, whether studying every day for a final or spending
vast amounts of money on a campaign, is designed to change the outcome in a
positive direction and the absence of this change implies minimal effects.
14
See id.
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from election to election is very rare.15 Not surprisingly, when the
same respondents are interviewed during an election, switching
sides within an election campaign is also rare.16
Based on the predictability of elections, Andrew Gelman and
Gary King conclude that the primary effect of campaigns is getting
voters to connect their vote choice to the above mentioned fundamentals.17 They argue that the reason vote intentions in surveys (often referred to as the “horse race polls”)18 fluctuate throughout the
campaign, though the election is predictable, is because early in the
campaign some voters have not yet connected their vote intentions
to the fundamentals.19 As Election Day approaches, more and more
of the electorate bases their vote intentions on the fundamentals,
leading national surveys in the final week or so of the election to
correspond very closely with the actual outcome.20
15
See Tess Eyrich, What Was Behind ‘Vote-Switching’ in the 2016 Election?,
UC RIVERSIDE NEWS (July 23, 2019), https://news.ucr.edu/articles/2019/
07/23/what-was-behind-vote-switching-2016-election; Diana C. Mutz & Sam
Wolken, Vote Switching from 2016 to 2020, ELECTION ANALYSIS,
https://www.electionanalysis.ws/us/president2020/section-2-voters/vote-switching-from-2016-to-2020/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
16
See Alexander Coppock et al., The Small Effects of Political Advertising
Are Small Regardless of Context, Message, Sender, or Receiver: Evidence from
59 Real-Time Randomized Experiments, 6 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 5 (2020); GABRIEL
S. LENZ, FOLLOW THE LEADER? HOW VOTERS RESPOND TO POLITICIANS’
POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE 185–87, 196 (2012); Peter K. Enns & Ashley Jardina, Complicating the Role of Racial Attitudes and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in
the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election, PUB. OP. Q. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript
at 17) (on file with authors).
17
See Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 449; PAUL F. LAZARSFELD ET AL.,
THE PEOPLE’S CHOICE: HOW THE VOTER MAKES UP HIS MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN 73 (2d ed. 1948) (emphasizing “activation” of latent predispositions
during campaigns); see also ERIKSON & WLEZIEN, supra note 5, at 2 (referring to
“crystallization of voter preferences over [a] campaign timeline.”).
18
Clifford Young, Cliff’s Take: Beware of Horse Race Polls, IPSOS (Aug.
14, 2020), https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/cliffs-take-beware-horse-race-polls.
19
See Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 419, 436 (analyzing more “fundamental” variables, such as partisanship and demographic variables, than those related to economic conditions and presidential approval).
20
Id. Although surveys are not always viewed by the public as accurate, the
record of high-quality national surveys prior to the election is incredibly strong.
Miller & Tomoko Mitamura, Are Surveys on Trust Trustworthy, 66 SOC. SCI. Q.
62, 62 (2003); Claudia Deane et al., A Field Guide to Polling: Election 2020
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While it is true that the fundamentals correlate more strongly
with vote intentions as the election approaches, Peter K. Enns and
Brian Richman provide substantial evidence that much of this shift
is not a result of campaign effects or voter learning.21 They argue
that most voters, even those who are not normally attuned to politics,
do not need a campaign to know how to connect fundamental considerations like economic conditions, approval of the incumbent
president, their partisan identity, or their race to whether to vote for
the Republican or Democratic candidate.22 Enns and Richman argue
that well in advance of the election, many survey respondents
simply do not treat the survey question, which asks how they would
vote if the election was held today, like the actual vote choice, which
is still months or weeks away.23
To understand their logic, imagine if someone asked what restaurant you wanted to go to three months from today. Three months
probably seems like a long way off, so considerations like what restaurant seems new, exciting, or even extravagant might guide your
response (perhaps you just read a restaurant review for a five-star
restaurant or heard a recommendation from a friend with expensive
tastes). Now imagine someone asked you what restaurant you
wanted to go to tonight. More fundamental considerations like cost,
location, and convenience would likely influence your response. In
the first scenario, when the choice was three months away, it was
not that you did not know how much money you had for dinner or
that convenience mattered. It is just that when a choice feels like it
Edition, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/methods/2019/11/19/a-field-guide-to-polling-election-2020-edition/#fn-585-1; Max
Witynski, Should You Trust the 2020 Election Polls? Yes, but…, UNIV. CHI. NEWS
(Oct. 23, 2020), https://news.uchicago.edu/story/should-you-trust-2020-electionpolls-yes. For example, in 2016, ten days before the election, ABC News reported
survey results that were within less than 1% of the outcome. See Gary Langer,
Shift in the Electorate’s Makeup Tightens the Presidential Contest (Poll), ABC
NEWS (Oct. 29, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/shift-electoratesmakeup-tightens-presidentialcontest-poll/story?id=43142198; see also Will Jennings & Christopher Wlezien, Election Polling Errors Across Time and Space, 2
NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 276, 278 (2018).
21
Peter K. Enns & Brian Richman, Presidential Campaigns and the Fundamentals Reconsidered, 75 J. POL. 803, 815–17 (2013); see Gelman & King, supra
note 5, at 419, 436.
22
See Enns & Richman, supra note 21, at 804–07.
23
See id. at 808, 816.
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is a long way away, different considerations often come to mind. As
the choice gets closer, fundamental considerations are more likely
to be considered.24 Enns and Richman argue the same process occurs during an election campaign.25 Early in the campaign, some
survey respondents might express their vote intention based on the
most recent headline, advertisement, or social media post they
saw.26 However, as the election gets closer, survey respondents increasingly treat the survey question about who they would vote for
like the actual election choice, relying on more fundamental considerations like partisanship, presidential approval, and economic conditions.27 As a result, we observe a closer alignment between the
fundamentals and reported vote intentions.28 In other words, it is
proximity to the election, not learning from the campaign, that matters.29
This is not to say that U.S. presidential campaigns have no influence. Candidates and campaigns can make certain issues more
salient to voters by emphasizing them more during the campaign,30
and these efforts can be heightened by emotional appeals.31 In some
cases, voters may be persuaded to support a different candidate,32
although this tends to be difficult and rare.33 Negative campaigning
can also influence the political environment by reducing the public’s
24

See id. at 806.
See id. at 804, 807.
26
See id. at 805–06, 816.
27
See id. at 805–06.
28
See id. at 806, 816.
29
See id. at 815–17. This conclusion aligns with evidence that when voters
learn of candidates’ policy positions, voters are more likely to adopt the positions
of their preferred candidate, not update which candidate they support. See LENZ ,
supra note 16, at 185, 196, 206–13.
30
See LYNN VAVRECK, THE MESSAGE MATTERS: THE ECONOMY AND
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 14 (2009).
31
See TED BRADER, CAMPAIGNING FOR HEARTS AND MINDS: HOW
EMOTIONAL APPEALS IN POLITICAL ADS WORK 111 (2006); GEORGE E. MARCUS
ET AL., AFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AND POLITICAL JUDGMENT 124 (2000).
32
See D. SUNSHINE HILLYGUS & TODD G. SHIELDS, THE PERSUADABLE
VOTER: WEDGE ISSUES IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS 68–69 (2008) (e-book);
Gregory A. Huber & Kevin Arceneaux, Identifying the Persuasive Effects of Presidential Advertising, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 957, 976 (2007).
33
Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, The Minimal Persuasive Effects
of Political Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 148, 163 (2018).
25
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sense of “political efficacy” and “trust in government.”34 Campaigns
can also have positive effects on voter turnout,35 although there is
also debate in political science about how much increased turnout
would alter typical presidential elections.36 In other words, presidential campaigns matter but much less than often thought.37 Indeed, in
a series of fifty-nine real-time experiments over eight months leading up to the 2016 election, Alexander Coppock, Seth J. Hill, and
Lynn Vavreck found only very small average effects of political advertising on voting behavior or even candidate likability.38
Of course, it is important to recognize that in a close election
anything could tip the final outcome.39 Donald Trump’s Electoral
College victory in 2016 came down to less than 80,000 votes across
three states.40 George W. Bush’s victory in 2000 came down to just
537 votes in Florida.41 As Barry Richard chronicled in his 2020
Symposium Keynote Address, the law certainly mattered for the

34
Richard R. Lau et al., The Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: A
Meta‐Analytic Reassessment, 69 J. POL. 1176, 1186 (2007).
35
See Ryan D. Enos & Anthony Fowler, Aggregate Effects of Large-Scale
Campaigns on Voter Turnout, 8 POL. SCI. RES. & METHODS 1, 15–16 (2016).
However, get-out-the-vote (“GOTV”) efforts may widen turnout disparities by
mobilizing those more likely to vote more than underrepresented citizens who are
less likely to vote. Ryan D. Enos et al., Increasing Inequality: The Effect of GOTV
Mobilization on the Composition of the Electorate, 76 J. POL. 273, 286 (2014).
36
See Glenn E. Mitchell & Christopher Wlezien, The Impact of Legal Constraints on Voter Registration, Turnout, and the Composition of the American
Electorate, 17 POL. BEHAV. 179, 196 (1995).
37
See J. Alexander Branham & Christopher Wlezien, Do Election Campaigns Matter? A Comparative Perspective and Overview, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ELECTORAL PERSUASION 184, 196 (Elizabeth Suhay et al. eds.,
2019); THOMAS M. HOLBROOK, DO CAMPAIGNS MATTER? 153 (1996).
38
See Coppock et al., supra note 16, at 5.
39
See David W. Nickerson & Todd Rogers, Campaigns Influence Election
Outcomes Less Than You Think, 369 SCI. MAG. 1181, 1181 (2020).
40
Philip Bump, Donald Trump Will Be President Thanks to 80,000 People in
Three States, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016, 3:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/01/donald-trump-will-be-president-thanks
-to-80000-people-in-three-states/.
41
See David Leip, 2000 Presidential General Election Results – Florida,
DAVE LEIP’S ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS (Nov. 1, 2020, 1:41 PM),
https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/.
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2000 election outcome in Florida and, therefore, nationally.42 Ballot
design and felon disenfranchisement also clearly influenced many
more than 537 votes in Florida.43 Nevertheless, it is important to
recognize that the potential influence of campaigns is much less than
often thought.44 To offer further insight into understanding the potential influence, or lack thereof, of campaigns, media, and the law
in U.S. presidential elections, the following section presents a statistical model to forecast the presidential vote in each state, including Washington, D.C., more than three months prior to the election.
This model helps establish the upper bounds on campaign and media
influence and offers a path for further understanding the extent to
which particular laws influence presidential election outcomes.
A NEW FORECAST MODEL OF STATE PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION OUTCOMES
As noted above, political scientists often emphasize the predictability of U.S. presidential elections.45 But this research focuses primarily on the predictability of the national popular vote.46 To better
II.

42

Barry Richard, Shareholder, Greenberg Traurig P.A., Keynote Address at
the 2020 University of Miami Law Review Symposium: What Swings the Vote
(Feb. 7, 2020).
43
See RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THE
NEXT ELECTION MELTDOWN 16, 28–29 (2012). Of course, given the closeness of
the 2000 election, myriad other factors mattered, too; one example is Vice President Gore’s advertising strategy may have cost him his home state of Tennessee.
See id.; DARON R. SHAW, THE RACE TO 270 149–50 (2006).
44
See Mike Cummings, Political Ads Have Little Persuasive Power, YALE
NEWS (Sept. 2, 2020), https://news.yale.edu/2020/09/02/political-ads-have-littlepersuasive-power.
45
Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 410–11, 448–49.
46
See, e.g., Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 419. See infra note 74 and accompanying text for state-level models and how they differ from our approach.;
Forecasting the US Elections, ECONOMIST, https://projects.economist.com/us2020-forecast/president (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (forecast by Andrew Gelman
and Merlin Heidemanns for 2020 election predicting outcome of Electoral College in 2020 election); How the Economist Presidential Forecast Works,
ECONOMIST, https://projects.economist.com/us-2020-forecast/president/how-this
-works (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (“The first step in our model is to generate a
prediction for the national popular vote on election day. We use two main sources
of information: national polls and ‘fundamentals’, the term in political science for
structural factors that influence voter decisions.”).
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understand the scope and limits of potential campaign effects, we
present a model we developed to forecast how each state votes in
U.S. presidential elections.47 Since the Electoral College, and not the
popular vote, decides who will become the next president, predicting state-level outcomes circumvents this American peculiarity.48
This way, our model also aligns more closely with strategies of political campaigns that mostly concentrate their efforts on a handful
of battle or swings states instead of the whole country.49
A.
How Does Our Forecast Model Work?
This forecast model includes multiple variables based on theoretical and empirical considerations and our full analysis includes
data back to 1980.50 However, to illustrate the logic of our forecast,
we first consider a single variable (presidential approval) from a single year.51 In Figure 1, the top panel reports each state’s presidential
approval rating during June and July 2012 on the x-axis.52 Higher
values correspond with more support for the incumbent president.
Presidential approval ranges from -20 to 30 because, as we explain
in the next Part, we adjust the standard approval rating so values
below zero imply an incumbent disadvantage and values above zero

47

Peter K. Enns & Julius Lagodny, Online Supplementary Appendix: Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner: The State Presidential Approval/State
Economy Model, CAMBRIDGE U. PRESS Online A-1, Online A-2 (2020) [hereinafter Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix], https://static.cambridge.org/
content/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:article:S1049096520001407/resource/name/
S1049096520001407sup001.pdf; Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1.
48
SHAW, supra note 43, at 125.
49
See Swing States Keep Campaigns Guessing, SHAREAMERICA (Oct. 29,
2020), https://share.america.gov/swing-states-keep-campaigns-guessing/; Robert
Alexander, The Battle to be the President of the Swing States of America, CNN
(Oct. 14, 2020, 10:57 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/14/opinions/presidentswing-states-of-america-opinion-alexander/index.html; Tamara Keith, Biden,
Trump Focus on Swing States as November’s Election Nears, NPR (Oct. 19, 2020,
7:08 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/10/19/925278573/biden-trump-focus-onswing-states-as-novembers-election-nears.
50
See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1.
51
See infra Figure 1.
52
Id.
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imply an incumbent advantage.53 On the y-axis, we graph the percentage of the two-party Democratic vote share in 2012 for each
state.54 In 2012, the Democratic candidate, Barack Obama, was the
incumbent President.55 We see that Utah had the lowest approval
rating of and the lowest vote support for President Obama.56 Washington, D.C., by contrast, had the highest approval rating and the
highest percentage of votes for President Obama.57 The other states
(not labeled) are scattered around the linear regression line, which
represents the best fitting line to the data (e.g., the line that minimizes the distance between the dots and a linear line through the
dots).58 Furthermore, the slope of the line is positive, relatively
steep, and the values of the states are very close to the best fitting
line.59 These patterns indicate a strong and positive relationship between presidential approval and vote choice in 2012.

53

See Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online

A-2.
54
Infra Figure 1. The two-party Democratic vote share is estimated as follows: % Democrats / (% Democrats + % Republicans) in each state.
55
See David Jackson, Obama’s Biggest Advantage: Incumbency, USA
TODAY (Oct. 20, 2012, 9:10 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2012/10/20/barack-obama-incumbent-mitt-romney-election-2012-history/
1646047/; Ford O’Connell, Barack Obama Won the Debate Because of Incumbent Advantage, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 23, 2012), https://www.usnews.com/debateclub/who-won-the-obama-romney-foreign-policy-debate/barack-obama-wonthe-debate-because-of-incumbent-advantage.
56
See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1, for a discussion of state-level approval data. For other state approval data, see Jeffrey M. Jones, Thirteen States and D.C. Give Obama Majority
Approval, GALLUP (Aug. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Jones, Thirteen States and D.C.
Give Obama Majority Approval], https://news.gallup.com/poll/156389/thirteenstates-give-obama-majority-approval.aspx (“His highest ratings by state were in
Hawaii (63%) and Rhode Island (58%), in addition to the 83% approval from
District of Columbia residents. In 16 states, his approval rating averaged below
40%, with residents of Utah, Wyoming, and Alaska least approving.”); Live Election Results: Utah, 270 TO WIN, https://www.270towin.com/states/Utah (last visited Dec. 17, 2020); and Figure 1.
57
See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1 for a discussion of state-level approval data. For other state approval data, see Jones, Thirteen States and D.C. Give Obama Majority Approval,
supra note 56 and infra Figure 1.
58
See infra Figure 1.
59
Id.
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Figure 1: A Simplified Illustration of Our Forecast Approach.60
60

This Figure uses the relationship between presidential approval and state
vote in 2012 to forecast Wisconsin’s 2016 vote based on presidential approval
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Still focusing on the top panel, we highlight Wisconsin, which
had an adjusted approval rating of 1.2 (shown on the x-axis), meaning just above what we would consider no incumbent advantage
(when adjusted, approval =0).61 On the y-axis, we see that in 2012,
President Obama received 53.5% of the two-party vote in Wisconsin.62
Now, focusing on the bottom panel (which repeats the regression
line and the dot for Wisconsin from the top panel), we use Wisconsin to illustrate how we can use this information to forecast the expected Democratic vote share in 2016 for Secretary Hillary Clinton.63 In 2016, the adjusted presidential approval rating for President
Obama from June and July 2016 had dropped to -3.2 (vertical
dashed line).64 The diagonal line is identical to the top panel and still
represents the relationship between presidential approval and vote
choice in 2012 (e.g., the previous election).65 We can now use the
information about the relationship between presidential approval
and vote choice in 2012 and the information about presidential approval in June and July 2016 to predict the November 2016 election
outcome. Note, this prediction does not use any information after
July, more than three months before the election.
First, we need to consider the presidential approval rating in
June and July 2016, which is lower (e.g., the vertical dashed line is
to the left of the Wisconsin dot) than in 2012.66 This suggests we
should expect Secretary Clinton to get a lower vote share than President Obama did in 2012. To determine how much, we follow the
from June–July of 2016. Our actual forecast model uses multiple variables and
data from all available prior years. Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1.
61
See supra Figure 1.
62
See id.
63
See id.
64
See id.
65
See id.
66
Id. See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner,
supra note 8, at 1, for a discussion of state-level approval data. For other state
approval data, see Wisconsin: Obama Job Approval, HUFFPOST POLLSTER,
https://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster/wisconsin-obama-job-approval (last
visited Jan. 24, 2021), and see also Presidential Approval Ratings – Barack
Obama, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/116479/barack-obama-presidential-job-approval.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (illustrating Barak Obama’s approval ratings through both terms in office).
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arrow down to the regression line. The point at which Wisconsin’s
2016 approval rating67 (-3.2, vertical dashed line) intersects with the
regression line from 2012 represents our 2016 prediction for Wisconsin.68 In this simple model, 100 days before the election, we
would predict that Secretary Clinton would receive 45.4% of the
two-party vote; she ended up receiving 49.6%.69 Although this simple model correctly predicts that Secretary Clinton would lose Wisconsin,70 our prediction is a notable 4% off. Thus, our actual models
include additional relevant variables and additional years of prior
data.71 However, the logic of the forecast model remains the same:
when including multiple variables, we estimate the relationship between these variables and vote outcomes in each state in prior
years.72 We then use these estimated relationships (represented by
the regression line in Figure 1) and actual variable values through
July of the next election to predict each state’s presidential vote.73
We detail our model’s variables below.
B.
Forecast Model Details
Although national election forecasts are the most common,
scholars have developed important forecast models of state vote

67

See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1, for a discussion of state-level approval data. For other state approval data, see Washington Post SurveyMonkey 50 State Poll, WASH. POST,
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3098997/2016-09-01-50-State-Survey-Trend-for-Release.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2021); New Marquette Law
School Poll Finds Clinton, Feingold Leading; Parties Remain Divided, MARQ.
UNIV. L. SCH. POLL, https://law.marquette.edu/poll/2016/11/02/mlsp41release/
(last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
68
See supra Figure 1.
69
WEC Canvass Reporting System, WIS. ELECTIONS COMM’N., https://elections.wi.gov/sites/elections.wi.gov/files/Statewide%20Results%20All%20Offices%20%28post-Presidential%20recount%29.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
Based on two-party vote share (% Clinton / (%Clinton+%Trump). Id.
70
See id.
71
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-3–
A-4.
72
See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1; supra Figure 1.
73
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-4–
A-5.
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outcomes.74 Our approach differs from existing approaches in three
important ways. First, in contrast to previous state-level election
forecasts, we measure approval of the incumbent president at the
state level.75 Prior forecasts, even those forecasting state-level outcomes, have focused on national-level approval ratings.76 Second,
we use the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s monthly index
of coincident economic indicators77 to measure economic conditions
in each state.78 This index is advantageous in our forecast model because it combines multiple economic measures and, therefore, incorporates multiple aspects of the economy.79 The strength of these
74
See Michael J. Berry & Kenneth N. Bickers, Forecasting the 2012 Presidential Election with State-Level Economic Indicators, 45 PS: POL. SCI. & POL.
669, 670 (2012); Patrick Hummel & David Rothschild, Fundamental Models for
Forecasting Elections at the State Level, 35 ELECTORAL STUD. 123, 123–24, 129,
133 (2014); Bruno Jerôme & Véronique Jerôme-Speziari, Forecasting the 2012
US Presidential Election: Lessons from a State-by-State Political Economy
Model, 45 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 663, 664–66 (2012); Bruno Jerôme & Véronique
Jerôme-Speziari, State-Level Forecasts for the 2016 US Presidential Elections:
Political Economy Model Predicts Hillary Clinton Victory, 49 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 680, 682 (2016) [hereinafter State-Level Forecasts for the 2016 US Presidential Elections: Political Economy Model Predicts Hillary Clinton Victory];
Carl E. Klarner, State-Level Forecasts of the 2012 Federal and Gubernatorial
Elections, PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 655, 656 (2012); James E. Campbell et al., Forecasting the Presidential Vote in the States, 1948-2004, 5 J. POL. MKTG. 33, 38,
42–43 (2006).
75
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-2;
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8,
at 1; see, e.g., Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 419; Forecasting the US Elections,
supra note 46; How the Economist Presidential Forecast Works, supra note 46.
76
See Berry & Bickers, supra note 74, at 670; Hummel & Rothschild, supra
note 74, at 123–24, 129, 133; Forecasting the 2012 US Presidential Election:
Lessons from a State-by-State Political Economy Model, supra note 74, at 664–
66; State-Level Forecasts for the 2016 US Presidential Elections: Political Economy Model Predicts Hillary Clinton Victory, supra note 74, at 682; Klarner, supra
note 74, at 656; Campbell et al., supra note 74, at 38, 42–43.
77
State Coincident Indexes, FED. RSRV. BANK PHILA., https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/regional-economy/indexes/coincident (last visited
Jan. 24, 2021); Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner,
supra note 8, at 1.
78
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-2–
A-3; Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1.
79
State Coincident Indexes, supra note 77; see Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting
the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1.
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two measures leads to a much more parsimonious model, which is
our third advantage. Where past state-level forecast models range
between thirteen and nineteen variables,80 our model predicts past
elections as well or better with just nine variables.81 The parsimony
of our model highlights how just a few key variables can predict the
election outcome and avoids overfitting our model, which can make
predictions worse.82
Another notable feature of our forecast is that we make it more
than three months prior to the election, using economic data available through June of election year and presidential approval data
available through June and July of election year.83 Thus, our forecasts are made around the time of or before the Republican and
Democratic nomination conventions,84 prior to the presidential and
vice-presidential debates,85 and before the onset of the most salient
campaign activities and media coverage.86 This timing implies that
if we are able to make accurate predictions, the influence of these
subsequent activities must be limited, or at least mostly offsetting,
80
See Hummel & Rothschild, supra note 74; State-Level Forecasts for the
2016 US Presidential Elections: Political Economy Model Predicts Hillary Clinton Victory, supra note 74.
81
Infra Figure 2.
82
Douglas M. Hawkins, The Problem of Overfitting, J. CHEM. INFO. &
COMPUT. SCI. 1, 2 (2004).
83
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-7.
84
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1. The earliest convention during our period of analysis was the 1980
Republican National Convention held between July 14 and 17. See Elizabeth
Drew, 1980: The Republican Convention, NEW YORKER, Aug. 11, 1980, at 38
(1980).
85
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-7;
see Presidential Debates (1960-2020), AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/presidential-documents-archive-guidebook/presidential-campaigns-debates-and-endorsements-0 (last visited Jan. 24,
2021).
86
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-4;
see 1980 Debates, COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, https://www.debates.org/debate-history/1980-debates/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021); 1984 Debates,
COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, https://www.debates.org/debate-history/1984-debates/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021); 1988 Debates, COMM’N ON
PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES, https://www.debates.org/debate-history/1988-debates/
(last visited Jan. 24, 2021); 1992 Debates, COMM’N ON PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES,
https://www.debates.org/debate-history/1992-debates/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
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since by definition, our model does not take them into account and
only looks at the underlying fundamentals.87 If campaign activities,
media, and social media were influencing votes and the election outcome, we would not be able to predict each state’s vote accurately.
As indicated above, while most political science election forecasts include presidential approval,88 a key contribution of our approach is estimating the percent approving of the president in each
state.89 Building on our earlier work,90 we use a statistical technique
called multi-level regression with poststratification (“MRP”) to estimate state-level public opinion from national surveys.91
MRP is a three-step approach that involves estimating a multilevel model to identify the relationship between demographic categories and the probability of
survey response (in this case indicating approval of
the president’s handling of the job of president), using these estimates to predict the probability of approval for each demographic-geographic [category]
(e.g., African American females, age 30-44, with
some college education, in Texas [or White males,
age 65+, with no high school degree in New York]),
87

See supra Part I; Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College
Winner, supra note 8, at 1.
88
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1–2; Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at
Online A-2.
89
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1.
90
See Peter K. Enns & Juliana Koch, Public Opinion in the U.S. States: 1956
to 2010, 13 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 349, 350 (2013); Peter K. Enns & Juliana Koch,
State Policy Mood: The Importance of Over-time Dynamics, 15 ST. POL. & POL’Y
Q. 436, 436–37 (2015); Peter K. Enns et al., Understanding the 2016 US Presidential Polls: The Importance of Hidden Trump Supporters, 8 STAT., POL. &
POL’Y 41, 51–52 (2017); PETER K. ENNS, INCARCERATION NATION: HOW THE
UNITED STATES BECAME THE PUNITIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD 134–35
(2016).
91
See Andrew Gelman & Thomas C. Little, Poststratification into Many Categories Using Hierarchical Logistic Regression, 23 SURV. METHODOLOGY 127,
129–34 (1997); Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, How Should We Estimate
Public Opinion in the States?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 107, 108–10 (2009); Julianna
Pacheco, Measuring and Evaluating Changes in State Opinion Across Eight Issues, 42 AM. POL. RSCH. 986, 987–1002 (2014).
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and then using census data to poststratify (i.e.,
weight) the responses to match actual state population values. MRP has repeatedly been shown to recover valid state-level measures of public opinion
from national surveys.92
Our MRP estimates of state presidential approval use seventy
surveys with almost 90,000 respondents from June and July of each
election year.93 We follow past research for national-level approval
and “subtract a constant [from this value] so that when our approval
variable equals zero, it is roughly equivalent to having no incumbent
advantage” after we estimate the percentage of voters in each state
who approve of the president.94 In a second step, we multiply the
approval rating by -1 when the incumbent is a Republican because
our outcome of interest is Democratic vote share.95
Because presidential election outcomes also reflect economic
conditions,96 we measure each state’s economic conditions with the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s monthly index of coincident
economic indicators.97 These data begin in January 1979, so 1980 is
the first election included in the analysis.98 This index uses four separate economic components, “nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in manufacturing, the unemployment rate . . . ,
and wage and salary disbursements,” to measure current economic

92
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-2–
Online A-4.; see Gelman & Little, supra note 91, at 129–34; Lax & Phillips, supra
note 91, at 108–09; Pacheco, supra note 91, at 987–88.
93
We accessed the survey data from the Roper Center for Public Opinion
Research at Cornell University (with one survey from Gallup Analytics), as explained in Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1; Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at
Online A-2–A-4, Online A-10–A-17.
94
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-2.
95
See Hummel & Rothschild, supra note 74, at 126.
96
Id. at 124.
97
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1; see State Coincident Indexes, supra note 77.
98
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1; see State Coincident Indexes, supra note 77; Beige Book Report: Philadelphia, FED. RSRV. BANK MINNEAPOLIS (Nov. 14, 1979), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/beige-book-reports/1979/1979-11-ph.
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conditions in each state.99 Similar to Erikson and Wlezien,100 we calculate the cumulative percentage change in coincident indicators
through June of election year, weighting months closer to the election more heavily.101
The model also includes each state’s past presidential vote,
measured as the deviation from the national vote in the past election,102 home state of the presidential candidate, the home state of
the presidential candidate in the previous election (to account for the
return to typical voting levels in that state in the subsequent election), and the vice presidential candidate’s home state.103 The forecast model also controls for the percentage of the vote in each state
that went to influential third-party candidates in the previous election and a binary indicator for the formerly Confederate states, capturing their Republican lean during the analysis period.104
Figure 2 presents the model including all data from 1980 through
2016.105 Values greater than zero mean that the estimated relationship between the variable and the percentage Democratic vote is
positive.106 Negative numbers imply a negative relationship.107 All
variables show the theoretically expected direction.108 The horizontal lines around the point estimates represent the 95% confidence
interval.109 This is a measure of uncertainty. None of the 95%

99

State Coincident Indexes, supra note 77.
See Robert S. Erikson & Christopher Wlezien, Forecasting the Presidential Vote with Leading Economic Indicators and the Polls, 49 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 669, 669–71 (2016).
101
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-2–
A-3. We have calculated the monthly percent change in each state’s coincident
index, weighting economic changes closer to the election more than changes earlier in the incumbent’s presidency. Id.
102
Id. at Online A-7; see Campbell et al., supra note 74, at 36; Hummel &
Rothschild, supra note 74, at 127 tbl.2.
103
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-4.
“[W]e code the state of the Democratic candidate 1, the state of the Republican
candidate -1, and all other states 0.” Id.
104
Id. at Online A-4.
105
Id. at Online A-3, Online A-5.
106
See infra Figure 2.
107
See id.
108
See id.
109
See id.
100
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confidence intervals overlap zero, indicating that all variables in the
model are statistically significant.110
All variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1, so the coefficients reported in Figure 2 are directly comparable.111 Not surprisingly, the percentage of the two-party vote that the Democratic
candidate received in a state in the previous presidential election is
the biggest predictor of that state’s vote share in the current election.112 This relationship indicates that voting outcomes in states
tend not to vary too much from election-to-election. State presidential approval and state economic conditions show the next largest
relationships.113 Substantively, these relationships suggest that if a
state went from the lowest to the highest approval rating, we would
expect about a 22% shift in Democratic vote share (+/- about 2.5%).
The magnitude for a similar shift in economic conditions is about
the same, but the uncertainty around this estimated relationship is
much greater. Model fit is excellent, with about 90% of the variance
in the dependent variable explained by the model.114

110

See id.
See id.
112
See id.; Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner,
supra note 8, at 1–2.
113
See infra Figure 2.
114
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1.
111
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Figure 2: Estimated Relationship (and 95% Confidence Intervals)
Between Forecast Model Variables and Percent Democratic Vote
in Each State, 1980–2016.
C.
Forecast Accuracy, 2004–2016
To generate our forecasts, we first estimate the relationship between the above variables and the percent of votes for the Democratic candidate (out of the votes received by each of the two major
parties) in each state in prior elections.115 As described above, we
then combine information from these relationships with data
through July of election year to forecast the vote in each state.116 Our
data begin in 1980, which is when the first election for which the

115
Id. at 1–2. Most election forecasts focus on two-party vote share because
the winner of the two-party vote is what ultimately matters in a majoritarian system, and this avoids the confounding effect of third parties. See HPR 2020 Presidential Election Forecast, HARV. POL. REV. (Nov. 2, 2020), https://harvardpolitics.com/hpr-2020-presidential-election-forecast/. The decision to focus on Democratic vote share is arbitrary; the Republican vote share would produce identical
conclusions.
116
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1.
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state-level index of coincident indicators data are available.117 Thus,
our 2004 forecast was based on the model from 1980 through 2000
and data through July 2004.118 Our 2008 forecast was based on a
model using data from 1980 through 2004 and data through July
2008.119 Using these model estimates that are based on previous
elections and information on model variables available through July
of election year, we forecast the election.120 Because all information
is from before the election, we refer to these as “before-the-fact”
forecasts.121
In this section, we discuss our forecasts from 2004 through 2016.
While our forecast model does well in all years,122 we are particularly interested in the four most recent presidential elections because
they include the elections that would be most influenced by social
media campaigns and the new digital era.123 These years also ensure
we have enough year-state data points from prior elections to make
reliable and stable forecasts, and they allow us to compare our forecast with other prominent forecasts of state-level presidential vote
outcomes.124
Figure 3 presents our before-the-fact forecast for each state (and
Washington, D.C.) for each of these elections (y-axis) along with
117

Id. These data are first available in January 1979. Id.; Enns & Lagodny,
Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-3. Because we use a
weighted cumulative average, having only 6 quarters of data for 1980 (instead of
14) does not pose a problem (average for 1980 is based on 6 quarters instead of
14). Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-3
(discussing full details on this economic measure).
118
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-2,
Online A-10–A-15.
119
Id.
120
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1.
121
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-4.
122
See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1 (discussing earlier forecasts from our model).
123
See Garnett & James, supra note 3, at 112.
124
Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-7–
A-8 (listing relevant comparison data); see Berry & Bickers, supra note 74, at 672
tbl.3; Hummel & Rothschild, supra note 74, at 136; Forecasting the 2012 US
Presidential Election: Lessons from a State-by-State Political Economy Model,
supra note 74, at 666 tbl.3; State-Level Forecasts for the 2016 US Presidential
Elections: Political Economy Model Predicts Hillary Clinton Victory, supra note
74, at 683 tbl.2; Klarner, supra note 74, at 660 tbl.4.
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the actual percentage of the two-party vote the candidate received in
each state in each of these elections (x-axis).125 If we perfectly predicted each state’s vote share, all dots would align on top of the gray
forty-five-degree diagonal line. While perfect predictions are, of
course, implausible, the predictions follow the line quite closely indicating a very high degree of accuracy. We predict the winner correctly in 94% of states during this period.126

Figure 3: Before-the-fact Forecasts and Actual Vote Share,
2004–2016.
To get a more concrete sense of the accuracy of our forecasts,
Figure 4 compares our forecasts with other prominent forecasts of
125

See infra Figure 3.
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1.
126
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U.S. state presidential votes.127 The left side of the figure compares
the absolute mean error across states for each forecast of the 2012
election.128 Our average error was the lowest across models and just
over 2% in 2012.129 The bottom panel compares our 2016 beforethe-fact forecast with that of Bruno Jerôme and Véronique JerômeSpeziari (the other scholars did not report 2016 state forecasts).130
Again, our model does quite well in a comparative sense.131

127

Infra Figure 4; Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47,
at Online A-4, Online A-7; see Hummel & Rothschild, supra note 74, at 133–34;
Forecasting the 2012 US Presidential Election: Lessons from a State-by-State
Political Economy Model, supra note 74, at 665–66 tbls.2–3; State-Level Forecasts for the 2016 US Presidential Elections: Political Economy Model Predicts
Hillary Clinton Victory, supra note 74, at 682–85; Klarner, supra note 74, at 660–
61 tbl.4; Berry & Bickers, supra note 74, at 673 tbl.3.
128
Supra Figure 3.
129
See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 3 tbl.2.
130
Supra Figure 3; see Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1; Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra
note 47, at Online A-7–A-8; State-Level Forecasts for the 2016 US Presidential
Elections: Political Economy Model Predicts Hillary Clinton Victory, supra note
74, at 682–83.
131
See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1, 3; Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at
Online A-7–A-8; State-Level Forecasts for the 2016 US Presidential Elections:
Political Economy Model Predicts Hillary Clinton Victory, supra note 74, at 682–
83.
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Figure 4:132 Absolute Mean Error of Our Model and Other
State-Level Forecast Models in 2012 (top panel) and
2016 (bottom panel).133
132

Values closer to the left indicate less error.
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 3 tbl.2.
133
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Remember that our model only uses information available about
100 days prior to the election.134 The most important variables in the
model are the fundamentals (economic conditions and presidential
approval) and how the state voted in the previous election.135 With
these, and a few other variables (candidates’ state of residence,
whether the state was part of the former Confederacy, and the percent of the vote previously received in the state by prominent thirdparty candidates), we are able to forecast each state’s vote with an
average error of about +/- 2% in 2012 and about +/- 3% in 2016.136
In a close election, 2 or 3% can obviously swing the outcome.137 But
recall that we correctly predict the winner in 94% of the states in our
analysis.138 Further, this appears to be the upper bound of potential
influence. It is possible that if we added additional variables or data
to our forecast model, we could improve the forecasts even more.
Candidates, political parties, and organized interest groups
spend hundreds of millions of dollars and vast amounts of time and
energy on campaigns.139 Yet, the outcome of the election in each
state—both in terms of who wins and the percent of votes received—ends about where we would have expected before most of
this took place. This continued to be the case in 2020. Based on data
from 104 days before the 2020 election, our model correctly predicted every state outcome, except for one.140
134

Id. at 1.
Id.
136
See Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online
A-3–A-4.
137
See, e.g., Richard A Posner, The 2000 Presidential Election: A Statistical
and Legal Analysis, 12 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2004).
138
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1.
139
See Brian Schwartz, The $10.8 Billion Election: 2020 Campaign Spending
is Smashing Records, CNBC (Oct. 1, 2020, 2:50 PM EDT), https://
www.cnbc.com/2020/10/01/election-2020-campaign-spending-set-to-hit-record11-billion.html; Rebecca Jacobs & Walker Davis, Special Interest Groups Likely
Spent More Than $13 Million at Trump Properties. They Got What They Paid
For., CITIZENS FOR ETHICS (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.citizensforethics.org/reports-investigations/crew-investigations/special-interest-groups-spent-13-million
-trump-properties/.
140
Peter K. Enns & Julius Lagodny, We Predicted the States Biden Would Win
100 Days Before the Election, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2020, 7:00 a.m. EST),
135
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IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING WHAT SWINGS THE
VOTE: DISENFRANCHISEMENT

A.
Our Methodology
Popular media stories often imply that a candidate’s rhetorical
missteps141 or behavioral subtleties like “wishful thinking” or “complacency” can swing the election outcome.142 However, if we truly
want to understand what swings the vote, we must understand how
much the vote can actually swing. We have argued that the potential
for political campaigns, candidate debates, and traditional and new
media to influence U.S. presidential elections is more limited than
often thought.143 Our argument builds on the longstanding view in
political science that national presidential election outcomes can be
predicted with a high degree of accuracy based on a few fundamental variables, such as economic conditions and approval of incumbent presidents.144
We extended this literature by presenting our state-level forecasting model to predict the Electoral College using only data available in June and July of the election year.145 Our mean error in 2012
is about 2%, and in 2016, it was less than 3%.146 From 2004 to 2016,
we accurately predict the winner of 94% of all states, and our forecast was even more accurate in 2020.147 The main implication of
these findings is that campaigning and media attention seem to contribute surprisingly little to the overall outcome of elections since
very little variation is “left” to be explained.148 Of course, the
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/11/12/we-predicted-states-biden
-would-win-100-days-before-election/.
141
See Bret Stephens, Biden’s Loose Lips Could Sink His Chances, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 24, 2020), https://nyti.ms/31olVrt.
142
George Packer, This Is How Biden Loses, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 28, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/08/how-biden-loses/615835/.
143
See supra Part I.
144
See Hummel & Rothschild, supra note 74, at 123-24; Enns & Richman,
supra note 21, at 815–17; Gelman & King, supra note 5, at 419, 436.
145
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1.
146
Id. at 3 tbl.2.
147
Id.; see Historical Presidential Elections, 270 TO WIN, https://
www.270towin.com/historical-presidential-elections/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
148
See supra Part I; see, e.g., STIMSON, supra note 5, at 93–95; ERIKSON &
WLEZIEN, supra note 5, at 7.
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millions of dollars spent on the campaign trail, vast social media
campaigns, and micro-targeting matter some;149 however, we must
remember that the fundamentals matter most, and there is relatively
little vote shifting that results from the campaign.150
In addition to helping understand the bounds or limits of campaign effects, our forecast approach also offers a potential path for
understanding how states’ policies and the law influence presidential elections. Specifically, we propose using the variation in the accuracy of forecasts to evaluate the effect of state laws.
B.

Estimating the Effects of Disenfranchisement and Voter
Registration Laws on Election Outcomes
Almost six million individuals in the United States are disenfranchised because they have been convicted of a felony.151 These
disenfranchisement laws vary dramatically, however, both across
states and over time.152 Vermont and Maine do not limit voting in
any way for those convicted of a crime.153 There, everyone has the
right to vote, even those currently in prison.154 Kentucky and Virginia law, by contrast, permanently disenfranchise anyone with a
felony conviction.155 Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Mississippi,
149
See supra Part I; see, e.g., OWEN, supra note 1, at 7, 11–12; Coppock et
al., supra note 16, at 6–7.
150
See supra Part I.
151
See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL
ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 3–4 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-Lost-Voters.pdf; Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/voting-rights/voter-restoration/felony-disenfranchisement-laws-map (last visited
Jan. 24, 2021).
152
Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 151.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
In 2019, Kentucky Governor, Andy Beshear, signed Executive Order
2019-003 Relating to the Restoration of Civil Rights for Convicted Felons, which
restored voting rights to more than 140,000 Kentuckians who had completed their
sentences for nonviolent felonies. See Ky. Exec. Order No. 2019-003 (Dec. 12,
2019). in 2016, Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe issued an order that restored
voting rights to Virginians with felony convictions, but this order was overturned
by the Virginia Supreme Court in Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E. 2d 706, 724 (Va.
2016). See Laura Vozzella, Virginia’s McAuliffe to Announce Restoration of
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Tennessee, and Wyoming are slightly less strict, having eliminated
voting rights for some felony convictions.156 Election forecasts
might help explain how these laws influence election outcomes.
Our state forecasts are generally quite accurate,157 but these forecasts do differ from the actual outcomes, and a handful of states differ by a fair amount (e.g., more than 5%).158 While numerous factors
account for these forecast errors, prohibiting those who have been
released from prison from voting may be an important potential factor. Recall that presidential approval ratings in each state are one of
the most important predictors in our forecast model.159 These approval estimates come from nearly 90,000 randomly selected adults,
reweighted to represent the demographic composition within each
state.160 Thus, presidential approval corresponds to the entire (noninstitutionalized) adult population of each state, even though some
states prohibit individuals from voting because of past felony convictions—even after they have served time in prison.161 As a result
of this mismatch, we might expect larger forecast errors in states that
have disenfranchised a greater proportion of the population.162 Further, given the disproportionate incarceration of African Americans
Voting Rights to 13,000 Felons, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginia-politics/virginias-mcauliffe-to-announce-restoration-of-voting-rights-to-13000-felons/2016/08/20/590b43ee-6652-11e6-96c037533479f3f5_story.html. As a result, Governor McAuliffe announced that he
would restore voting rights on an individual basis to those who had completed
their sentences. See id.; Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 151.
156
See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 151.
157
See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1–3.
158
Between 2004 and 2016, just twenty-three states (or 11% of all state forecasts) have a forecast error greater than 5% with the highest forecast error being
Arkansas, just under 11% in 2008.
159
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1. For other state approval data, see Jeffrey M. Jones, Presidential Job
Approval Related to Reelection Historically, GALLUP (May 29, 2020), https://
news.gallup.com/poll/311825/presidential-job-approval-related-reelection-historically.aspx.
160
Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra
note 8, at 1.
161
See Felon Voting Rights, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 1,
2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-votingrights.aspx; Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 151.
162
See Felon Voting Rights, supra note 161.
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who tend to lean strongly Democratic,163 we might expect to overpredict Democratic support in these states because our presidential
approval ratings include these individuals, who cannot vote. Accordingly, vote outcomes would not mirror projected Democratic
support because of disenfranchisement laws.164
The negative relationship between our southern state variable
and Democratic vote share in Figure 2 may provide preliminary support for this hypothesis.165 We code the formerly Confederate states
as “Southern,” which are among the most restrictive in terms of disenfranchisement.166 It may be that part of the reason our model overestimates Democratic vote share in these states (as indicated by the
negative relationship on this variable) is that those who are most
likely to be disenfranchised by the criminal legal system are most
likely to support Democratic candidates.167 To further test this hypothesis, future research might add a variable to the forecast model
to control for the portion of the state population that is ineligible to
vote due to disenfranchisement laws. A decrease in forecast error
when this variable is included in the model would provide evidence
163

See How Groups Voted in 2016, ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OP. RSCH.,
https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/how-groups-voted-2016 (last visited Jan. 24,
2021) (around 90% of African Americans typically vote for the Democratic presidential candidate.); Peter K. Enns et al., What Percentage of Americans Have
Ever Had a Family Member Incarcerated?: Evidence from the Family History of
Incarceration Survey (FamHIS), 5 SOCIO. RSCH. FOR DYNAMIC WORLD 1, 5–6
(2019); see also ASHLEY NELLIS, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 3–4 (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-Justice-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-inState-Prisons.pdf (discussing racial disparities in prison).
164
See Felony Disenfranchisement Laws (Map), supra note 151.
165
See supra Figure 2.
166
See Felon Voting Rights, supra note 161. Specifically, our Southern variable includes Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. See id.; Enns &
Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online A-4. All these states
prohibit voting until after parole ends, which is considered part of the sentence.
Felon Voting Rights, supra note 161; see also State Elections Legislation Database, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 5, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/elections-legislation-database.aspx (provides an
up-to-date database of election laws in fifty states).
167
Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOCIO. REV.
777, 779 (2002).
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of how disenfranchising those convicted of felonies influences presidential election outcomes.
Recent changes in state law and policy offer another analytic approach. For example, in November 2018, Floridians voted to restore
voting rights of those convicted of felonies (except for murder or
sexual offenses) after they completed all terms of their sentences,
including parole or probation.168 Initially, up to 1.4 million Floridians were expected to gain the right to vote from Amendment 4.169
However, the number able to vote in 2020 was closer to 800,000
because Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and the Republican-controlled legislature passed legislation to require that “all court-imposed fees, restitution and other financial obligations” be paid before those who regained their right to vote through Amendment 4
can register to vote.170
Although the exact number of new Floridians eligible to vote is
less than originally thought after Amendment 4 passed, the number
is still substantial.171 Most scholars argue that Florida’s permanent
disenfranchisement of those who have committed a felony has been
a pivotal factor in past elections,172 but there is some debate on that
168

FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (amended 2018).
Id.; P.R. Lockhart, Florida Legislature Approves Bill Requiring Former
Felons to Pay Fines and Fees Before Voting, VOX (May 3, 2019, 5:30 PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/5/3/18528564/amendment-4florida-felon-voting-rights-fees; Florida Ex-Felons Can Begin Registering to
Vote as Amendment Takes Effect, CBS NEWS (Jan. 8, 2019, 3:26 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/florida-ex-felons-begin-registering-to-vote-asamendment-4-takes-effect/.
170
See Jeffrey Schweers, ‘New Beginning’ for Florida Felons: Registrations
Continue Amid Voting Rights Fight, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Nov. 21, 2019,
7:20 PM), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/local/state/2019/11/21/florida-felons-still-registering-amidst-amendment-4-legal-battle/4223319002/.
171
Id.
172
See Amber Philips, How a Court Battle on Felon Voting Rights in Florida
Could Affect the 2020 Election, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2020, 2:54 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/02/19/florida-felon-votingrights-explained/; Coulter Jones & Jon Kamp, In 2020 Election, Florida Felon
Voting Limits Could Sway State Outcome, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2020, 8:03 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-2020-election-florida-felon-voting-limits-couldsway-state-outcome-11601467381; see also Uggen & Manza, supra note 167, at
786, 792 (“[T]he survey data suggest that Democratic candidates would have received about 7 of every 10 votes cast by the felons and ex-felons in 15 of the back
15 Senate Election years.”).
169
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point.173 Our forecast model offers a direct method of estimating the
effects of Amendment 4. Specifically, since those with felony convictions who have been released from prison have always been eligible to participate in the surveys that estimate Floridians’ presidential approval,174 we would expect our forecast in Florida to become
more accurate as more of these individuals become eligible to vote.
Of course, there are other sources of forecast error that also vary
from year-to-year, such as uncertainty around economic conditions
(recall that state economic conditions are also in our forecast
model).175 However, all else equal, less forecast error in 2020 would
be consistent with evidence of Amendment 4 influencing Florida’s
presidential vote.176
Similar analyses could be done in other states that have restored
voting rights.177 For example, as noted above, while Virginia law
still permanently prohibits those with a felony conviction from ever
voting, Governors Terry McAuliffe and Ralph Northam have restored approximately 200,000 voters through executive action.178
Shifts in other laws related to voting, such as voter ID laws, whose
effects are notoriously difficult to study,179 can also be studied by
comparing the size of forecast errors over time. If changes in voter
173

See Traci Burch, Did Disenfranchisement Laws Help Elect President
Bush? New Evidence on the Turnout Rates and Candidate Preferences of Florida’s Ex-Felons, 34 POL. BEHAV. 1, 24 (2012).
174
See Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online
A-2–A-4 (discussing variables within model).
175
Id.
176
See Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online
A-7–A-8; Andrew Quintana & Daniela Flamini, Guide to Florida’s 2020 General
Election: What Will Be on the Ballot?, NBC MIA. (Oct. 9, 2020, 12:44 PM),
https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/politics/decision-2020/guide-to-floridas-2020general-election-what-will-be-on-the-ballot/2292377/.
177
Nolan D. McCaskill, Felons Have the Potential to Swing Close 2020
Races, POLITICO (Sept. 11, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/09/11/felon-votes-swing-2020-races-409495.
178
Margaret Barthel, Nearly 200,000 Formerly Incarcerated Virginians Have
Their Voting Rights Back. Will They Use Them?, WAMU88.5 (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://wamu.org/story/19/11/05/nearly-200000-formerly-incarcerated-virginians-have-their-voting-rights-back-will-they-use-them/.
179
See Benjamin Highton, Voter Identification Laws and Turnout in the
United States, 20 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 149, 150 (2017); Justin Grimmer et al.,
Obstacles to Estimating Voter ID Laws’ Effect on Turnout, 80 J. POL. 1045, 1045,
1050–51 (2018).
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ID laws have a disproportionate effect on turnout, we would expect
our forecast errors to increase after the implementation of such a
law, as certain groups are less likely to turn out in the subsequent
elections, adding some bias to forecasts in those states.180
Evaluating forecast errors across states and time allows a direct
test of the aggregate effects of state laws that affect who votes.181 To
facilitate these types of analyses, we have made all our forecast data
publicly available.182 When scholars conduct these types of analyses, several factors must be kept in mind. First, the proposed research design to use forecasts can only identify aggregate effects: If
re-enfranchising citizens or increased voter restrictions push the
election outcome in one direction, but another factor pushes the vote
in the opposite direction, the aggregate result will be offsetting and
will appear like no effect—even though the effect was real.183 Second, the effects of these laws could differ from election to election,
which would complicate the proposed analysis.184 For example, the
effects might differ depending on whether the election outcome was
expected to be close.185 Third, scholars must remember that many
unobserved factors influence forecast error.186 Thus, we propose that
researchers evaluate whether a change in election-related law led to
a vote outcome beyond what we would have expected based on the

180

Oppose Voted ID Legislation - Fact Sheet, ACLU (May 2017),
https://www.aclu.org/other/oppose-voter-id-legislation-fact-sheet.
181
See Enns & Lagodny, Supplementary Appendix, supra note 47, at Online
A-7–A-8; State Felon Voting Laws, BRITANNICA, https://felonvoting.procon.org/state-felon-voting-laws/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (providing a fiftystate survey of election laws relating to felons).
182
Enns & Lagodny, Replication Data, supra note 10.
183
See Jason D. Mycoff et al., The Effect of Voter Identification Laws on Aggregate and Individual Level Turnout 15 (2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the Brennan Center for Justice).
184
See What Affects Voter Turnout Rates, FAIRVOTE, https://
www.fairvote.org/what_affects_voter_turnout_rates (last visited Jan. 24, 2021).
185
See id.
186
See Marc Meredith & Neil Malhotra, Convenience Voting Can Affect Election Outcomes, 10 ELECTION L.J. 227, 228 (2011); Johannas Tang Kristensen,
Factor-Based Forecasting in the Presence of Outliers: Are Factors Better Selected and Estimated by the Median Than by the Mean?, 18 STUD. NONLINEAR &
ECONOMETRICS 309, 310, 330 (demonstrating that “outliers” are important to account for in factor-based forecasting).
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distribution of potential forecast outcomes in that particular state.187
That is, researchers should seek to identify whether a shift in a
state’s law corresponds with a statistically significant shift in forecast error. States that did not have an election-related law change
can be used as a placebo analysis because we would expect no corresponding divergence between forecasts and outcomes in states that
did not have changes in election-related laws.188
Importantly, even if future works find limited or no effects on
election outcomes, there are still numerous reasons to challenge
laws that disenfranchise citizens or limit voter turnout. First, as
noted above, effects may be real but offset by other factors, or the
effects may be moderated by the election context, such as how close
the outcome is expected to be.189 Second, our proposed analysis focuses on U.S. presidential elections. It is possible, perhaps even
likely, that effects are more pronounced in state-level and local elections. Third, even if election outcomes remain the same, there are
legal and moral considerations for increasing access to vote.190 Finally, evidence suggests that re-enfranchising those who have been
convicted of a felony carries social benefits, such as reduced recidivism and positive economic outcomes.191 It is important to understand how election-related laws influence election outcomes, but
187

See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1.
188
See State Felon Voting Laws, supra note 181.
189
See What Affects Voter Turnout Rates, supra note 184.
190
See Kendall Thomas, Racial Justice: Moral or Political?, 17 NAT’L BLACK
L. J. 222, 244 (2002); Ako Ufodike, U.S. Election Results May Suggest Ethics No
Longer Matter . . . Just Like in Canada, CONVERSATION, https://theconversation.com/u-s-election-results-may-suggest-ethics-no-longer-matter-just-like-incanada-149248 (last visited Jan. 24, 2021); Judy Nadler & Miriam Schulman,
Campaign Ethics, MARKKULA CTR. APPLIED ETHICS, https://www.scu.edu/government-ethics/resources/what-is-government-ethics/campaign-ethics/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2021); see also Ethics: Public Service is a Public Trust, CLC,
https://campaignlegal.org/issues/ethics (last visited Jan. 24, 2021) (acting as a
“watchdog” and proposing that solutions for greater accountability at all level of
government).
191
See Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith & Matt Vogel, The Violence of Voicelessness: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement on Recidivism, 22 BERKELEY
LA RAZA L.J. 407, 413–14 (2012); WASH. ECON. GRP., INC., ECONOMIC IMPACTS
OF RESTORING THE ELIGIBILITY TO VOTE FOR FLORIDIANS WITH FELONY
CONVICTIONS AS A RESULT OF PASSAGE OF AMENDMENT 4, at 1–2 (2018).
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this is not the only criterion that should be used to evaluate these
laws.
CONCLUSION
We have extended past work on the predictability of U.S. presidential elections by presenting a forecast model of each state’s presidential vote.192 The accuracy of these “before-the-fact” forecasts
offer several insights into U.S. elections.193 First, the accuracy of
forecasts helps establish an upper bound for the potential of campaigns, traditional media, and even social media to influence election outcomes.194 Our average state forecast error was between 2 and
3%, suggesting that the potential to swing the vote is quite limited.195 Our 2020 forecast correctly predicted the winner in all but
one state.196 That being said, recent U.S. presidential elections have
seen a few thousand votes in specific states (as in 2016) or even a
few hundred votes in one state (as in 2000) determine the final outcome.197 In these types of elections, almost anything can tip the final
outcome.
However, even when elections are this close,198 we have shown
how forecasts offer an additional analytic tool for estimating the effects of election-related laws, such as legal or policy changes relating to enfranchising those who have been convicted of felonies or
laws increasing restrictions on voter ID requirements.199 While
192
See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 1–4.
193
See id. at 1.
194
See supra Part I.
195
See Enns & Lagodny, Forecasting the 2020 Electoral College Winner, supra note 8, at 3 tbl.2.
196
See Enns & Lagodny, supra note 140.
197
David Catanese, The 10 Closest States in the 2016 Election, U.S. NEWS
(Nov. 14, 2019, 4:39 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/the-run-2016/articles/2016-11-14/the-10-closest-states-in-the-2016-election; November 7, 2000
General Election Official Results: President of the United States, FLA. DEP’T OF
STATE: DIV. OF ELECTIONS, https://results.elections.myflorida.com/SummaryRpt.
asp?ElectionDate=11/7/2000&Race=PRE&DATAMODE= (last visited Jan. 24,
2021).
198
See Catanese, supra note 197; November 7, 2000 General Election Official
Results: President of the United States, supra note 197.
199
See supra Part III.A.
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estimating these effects are notoriously difficult, we believe forecasts offer an additional analytic strategy. Thus, we have made our
data and replication code publicly available to support these efforts.200

200

Enns & Lagodny, Replication Data, supra note 10.
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